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PRIVATE SCHOOLS MUST INTEGRATE?
David C. Briggs (ed.) *
Since the Brown v. Board of Education' decision the difficulties
surrounding the integration of public schools have received such
widespread publicity, that little public attention has been given the
possibility that private schools may also be required to integrate.
However, during the period following the Brown case, the scope
of "state action" has been gradually extended by the courts. Dis-
crimination formerly considered merely private action has been
found to be within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment.
In April 1962, the decision in Guillory v. Tulane Univ.' presented the
question of whether private schools may continue to discriminate.
Because of considerable interest in this question, a hypothetical
case with a fact situation similar to that in the Guillory case was
recently argued before the Texas Supreme Court by the Case Club'
of Southern Methodist University Law School. Arguments from
both briefs are presented here in an adapted form. In this hypotheti-
cal case in the Supreme Court of the mythical State of Rhea, Marshall
Smith, a Negro, sought admission to Wheat University, where he
was denied admittance solely on the basis of his race. The trial court
granted the University's motion for summary judgment and this
was affirmed by the court of civil appeals.
Wheat University was founded in the City of Pottsville in 1924
through the efforts of a private group who raised 10,000,000 dollars
through charitable contributions. The University was granted a
charter by the State of Rhea as a private, non-profit, educational
corporation. The charter contained a provision specifying that
Wheat University was to educate only students of Caucasian an-
cestry. The University was granted an exemption from state, county,
and local taxes, the monetary benefit of which has amounted to a
total of 800,000 dollars. Since 1924, one hundred million dollars in
charitable contributions have been granted to Wheat. All of this
has been considered deductible for federal income tax purposes.
In 1936, a fifty-acre tract was conveyed to the University in
determinable fee by Mr. and Mrs. Walsh. The deed provided that
title to the land would automatically revert to the Walsh estate if
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it should ever be used for a purpose other than the education of stu-
dents of the Caucasian race. In 1960 a men's dormitory was con-
structed on the Walsh tract with the aid of a three million dollar
loan extended by the federal government through the Housing and
Home Finance Agency. The present value of the tract is five million
dollars.
Petitioner, Marshall Smith, a life-long citizen of Pottsville, ap-
plied for admission to Wheat University within the proper time and
according to the regulations of the University; he asked to be en-
rolled in the freshman class entering the school in September 1961.
Smith's grades, recommendations, and qualifications were such that
if he were a Caucasian he would have been admitted to the Uni-
versity. The University admitted that the sole reason for his rejection
was his race.
I. THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION
A. The Automatic Reverter
Respondents seek to exclude the Petitioner from Wheat University
by arguing that alleged "irreparable injury" would result from the
admission of a non-Caucasian student. This supposed injury would
result from the reversion of the Walsh property to his heirs. The
court below justified its decision by stating:
The material value of this loss alone would amount to $5,000,000.
* [The] right [of association] should not be purchased at so great
a cost as asked by the appellant here.
This justification is invalid because:
(1) The property would not revert to the Walsh heirs, and
(2) Even if it would, its reversion could not be asserted as a
defense to Petitioner's rights.
The property would not revert to the Walsh heirs because perfec-
tion of the title in the Walsh heirs would require either (a) that
the University voluntarily abandon the property, or (b) that action
in the courts be brought to compel the University to abandon the
property.
In the first alternative, it is obvious that the University cannot
assert its own voluntary action as a bar to Petitioner's admission.
Thus, the only action which the University could assert in defense
of its refusal to admit Petitioner would be the adverse result of court
action by the Walsh heirs against the University. Any judgment
of a court in such an action in favor of the heirs would be state
action enforcing discrimination in contravention of the equal pro-
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tection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and art. 1, sec. 3 of the Texas Constitution.
Thus, the property could not revert to the heirs.
The court below cited four cases which do not sustain its holding.
The three state cases4 are identical in their facts, but prior in time,
to Shelley v. Kraemer. These three state cases are no longer the law.
The other case, Corrigan v. Buckley,6 was carefully distinguished in
Shelley,7 as raising no question involving either the fifth or the
fourteenth amendments. There is no legal basis for holding that the
property would revert. On the contrary, it is clear that Walsh's
heirs may not use the courts to compel the University to discriminate.!
This very principle has been applied in Texas.!
Respondent argues that a distinction must be drawn on the basis
of the "automatic" aspect of the reverter, citing Charlotte Park &
Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer." The North Carolina court in that
case found a distinction between a right of entry and a condition
subsequent, holding that the latter did not require state action to
enforce it. Petitioner submits that the case is completely erroneous.
Significantly, no published comment on the Barringer case has ap-
proved it. 1 Moreover, it is obvious that the very spirit of Shelley v.
Kraemer is violated by such a holding." If the court should follow
such strained reasoning, constitutional rights would be "inevitably
measurable in terms of ancient niceties of . . . real property law,"
and such action cannot be tolerated by the Constitution. 3
But, even if Respondent were correct in asserting that court action
would not be required to make the reverter meaningful, the very
fact that the reversion is to work by "operation of law" is sufficient
4 Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Meade
v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625,
188 N.W. 330 (1922).
5334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6271 U.S. 323 (1926).
7334 U.S. at 8-9.
'Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948 - San Antonio) error ref.
n.r.e. Justice Norvell held on the authority of Shelley v. Kraemer that a restriction in a
deed which prohibited sale to a Mexican could not be enforced by the court, because so to do
would be state action enforcing discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
'0242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
"1Recent Case, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 191 (1956); Recent Decision, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 698
(1956); Case Note, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 136 (1955); Case Note, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 113 (1955);
Recent Case, 32 N.D.L. Rev. 61 (1956); Case Note, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 243 (1956);
Recent Decision, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 478 (1956); Recent Case, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1956).
"See Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 366, 373 (1955).
"SChapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960); Recent
Casenote, 14 Sw. L.J. 521, 525 (1960).
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to invalidate it, for when the force of law is brought to bear to
enforce or uphold discrimination, equal protection of the laws is
denied." The language of Mr. Justice Clark, when he was Attorney
General, in his brief as amicus curiae in Shelley v. Kraemer, is
appropriate:
Racial discriminations which are merely the wrongful acts of in-
dividuals can remain outside the ban of the Constitution only so long
as they are unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, cus-
toms, or judicial or executive proceedings."
Thus, it is clear that action of the courts is not necessary to invali-
date the reverter in this case. The mere fact that it purports to act
by "operation of law" is sufficient to bring it within the scope of
the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. The contention that
court action is the only kind of state action has no validity. As
Justice Brandeis said:
[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as
it is enforced in a State . . . [is] the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State . . ."
The "law" can no more discriminate than the courts or the legisla-
ture. Individuals may; but only by their voluntary act and not
under the compulsion of the law, either directly or indirectly. Wheat
University cannot be ousted from the Walsh tract.
Recently, a case identical to the present one has been decided in
the manner which Petitioner urges. In Guillory v. Tulane Univ.,"
the federal district court ordered the integration of Tulane Uni-
versity. In that case also, there were private gifts with discrimination
clauses. The court stated:
Nor do the white restrictions in some of the donations to the Uni-
versity supply a constitutional basis for racial discrimination. What-
ever effect they may have, these conditions cannot affect the Univer-
sity's admissions policy. Insofar as they would require exclusion of any
racial group, they are judicially unenforceable.
However, even if the reversion could in some way be effective,
it is clear that this would be no defense to the denial of Petitioner's
"4Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 92 L. Ed. 1165, Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
" Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Justice Brandeis quoted from Justice
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
J'- F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
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constitutional rights. In Cooper v. Aaron,8 the Court refused to
deny the enforcement of constitutional rights in spite of the exist-
ence of local prejudice and the danger of violence and riots if they
were enforced. The Court said:
The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or
yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the
actions of the Governor and the Legislature . . . law and order are
not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their
constitutional rights. 9
Surely, it cannot be seriously contended that the speculative and
conjectural loss of a tract of land is comparable in gravity to
threatened civil disorder. Petitioner's constitutional right must take
precedence. As Judge Wright said in Guillory v. Tulane Univ.:
Whether or not the state courts ultimately determine that Tulane
is bound by the restrictions in the donations it has accepted, the Uni-
versity cannot constitutionally be compelled to honor racially dis-
criminatory conditions.'
But, even if the loss were certain, Respondent's position would be
no different, for the test of the right to challenge constitutionality
is "whether the damage claimed springs directly to plaintiffs from
defendants. If it is incidental, if it is indirect, defendant may not
invoke the court's jurisdiction."" The court below stated that
petitioner's rights "should not be purchased at so great a cost ... "
Petitioner's rights' cannot be purchased at any price. They are "free-
doms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our
constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a
living truth.""
B. The State Charter
1. Impairment of Contract
Wheat University, in 1924, obtained from the State of Rhea a
special charter as a non-profit charitable corporation. The grant
of the charter to the University was an act of grace on the part of
the State of Rhea; it could not be compelled."
However, Respondent contended below that since the charter
granted to Wheat University by the State of Rhea contained an
express provision that a purpose of the university was "the educa-
'8358 U.S. 1 (1958).
19 Id. at 16.
'0 - F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
aiEx-Cell-O Corp. v. City of Chicago, 115 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1940).
*aCooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958).
"A. B. Frank Co. v. Latham, 145 Tex. 30, 193 S.W.2d 671 (1946).
[Vol. 16
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tion of students of Caucasian ancestry only," it is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to discriminate because of race in formulating
and administering its admission policy. The flaw in this contention
is that the contractual provision concerned here is not a valid one-
and never was!
The Constitution of the United States is not such an impotent and
easily circumvented instrument as Respondent would have the court
believe. It is not shorn of its vitality and authority simply because
a State purports to enter into a contract. A State cannot, even in-
directly, obviate the federal constitution,"4 nor will an indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities satisfy the Constitution." Whenever a
state is a party to a contract containing a provision repugnant to
the Constitution, the offending provision is void ab initio.' A bind-
ing contract must first exist before a contract can be impaired.
Since Rhea was under no compulsion to grant a charter to Wheat
University, it was not compelled to lend its aid to a racially dis-
criminatory scheme. It could have declined to become a party to a
contract patently attempting to perpetuate a pattern of racial dis-
crimination. Instead, it blessed it. It dignified it. It embraced it.
The sovereign State of Rhea purported to bind itself and the uni-
versity by a contractual provision limiting the purpose of the new
university to the education of students "of Caucasian ancestry only."
There can be no doubt that Rhea actively and positively fostered
racial discrimination among its citizens. And State action of this
sort is abominable to the federal constitution. Measure the words of
Chief Justice Vinson speaking for an undivided court in Shelley
v. Kraemer:
Nor is the [Fourteenth] Amendment ineffective simply because the
particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced,
was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement. State action
as that term is understood for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, refers to the exertion of State power in all forms. And when
the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to
enforce the Constitutional commands.27
This court need have no fear of impairing the contractual right
of Wheat University to admit students "of Caucasian ancestry only."
No such right exists, for in law, there is no such provision in the
charter. The provision was void ab initio because the attempt by
2 4 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
21 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Taylor, 79 Okla. 142, 192 Pac. 349 (1920).
27334 U.S. at 20.
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Rhea to bind itself in such a way was an unconstitutional exercise
of its power. A void contractual right cannot be impaired.28
Even assuming, arguendo, that only private racial discrimination
is here involved, it is no help to Respondent that, in 1924 when the
charter was granted, it had not yet been decided that a State may
not constitutionally lend the weight of its authority in aid of private
racial discrimination. State action otherwise void as unconstitutional
is not made valid by ignorance of its true character.29
2. The Power to Discriminate
Respondent also contends that because it was organized as a private
non-profit corporation it is free to engage in racial discrimination
to the same extent that a private natural person may do. This notion
is demonstrably incorrect.
As Respondent points out, the fourteenth amendment does not
condemn racial discrimination per se; it only forbids the State, or
an instrumentality of the State, to engage in such discrimination, 0 or
to promote or lend its power in aid of private racial discrimination."
But Respondent fails to mention that if the State is without power
to practice racial discrimination, an entity created by the State-
possessing no powers except those vested in it by the State-is equally
without power to do so.
The corporate person is purely a creation of the State."2 A corpora-
tion has no being, no existence, no status in the eyes of the law
until the generative power of the State is brought to bear. Inexorable
logic, as well as law, compels the admission that the corporation
cannot possess greater power than the State itself possesses.
Chief Justice Marshall expressed it this way:
Without ascribing to this body, which in its corporate capacity is
the mere creature of the act to which it owes its existence, all the
qualities and disabilities annexed by the common law to ancient insti-
tutions of this sort, it may correctly be said to be precisely what the
incorporating act has made it, to derive all its power from that act,
and to be capable of exercising its faculties only in the manner which
that act authorizes.
To this source of its being then, we must recur to ascertain its
powers ... "
2"New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891); Shumaker v.
Borough of Dalton, 51 F.2d 793 (M.D. Pa. 1931).
2Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1947), cerl denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
0Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3lBarrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
32 Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804); A. B. Frank
Co. v. Latham, 145 Tex. 30, 193 S.W.2d 671 (1946).
" Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., supra note 32, at 167.
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It is well settled that a State cannot constitutionally discriminate
on the basis of race."4 It cannot, because the State itself possesses only
derivative powers. All its powers are derived directly from those of
the people-the natural persons who created it. " The people do possess
the power to discriminate on the basis of race, but, by enacting the
fourteenth amendment, they prohibited the State from discrimi-
nating. The remaining power of the State was thereby specifically
limited. Since the State did not possess the power, it could not vest
that power in the corporation. And since the powers of the corpora-
tion are wholly derivative of the State, the corporation does not
possess the legal power to discriminate because of race.
Respondent contends that equal protection of the laws is not
denied except when the State actively participates in every act of a
chain of acts ultimately resulting in racial discrimination. " Surely
the requirement is not so broad. Even in dissenting from a majority
opinion declaring that equal protection of the laws is denied when a
State merely leases land to a party who later uses it discriminatorily,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
For a State to place its authority behind discriminatory treatment
based on color is indubitably a denial by a State of equal protection
of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
Respondent suggests that the scope of this principle is unlimited
in application, imposing a new and terrible burden upon the busi-
1
4 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948).
3SMartin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
a To support its thesis that a corporation can freely discriminate on the basis of race,
Respondent cited several cases, which are distinguishable: Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), was decided long before the fourteenth amend-
ment was enacted in 1868. Moreover, it dealt only with the impairment of the corporate
charters by a State, not with the intrinsic limitations of corporate power. Williams v. How-
ard Johnson Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959), did not even concern a corporation
and in any event was inferentially overruled by Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961). Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72
N.E.2d 697 (1947), very carefully distinguished the license involved there "which is no
more than a permission to exercise a pre-existing right or privilege," from a franchise which
is "a special privilege, conferred by the State on an individual which does not belong to the
individual as a matter of common right." Slack v. Atlantic White Tower, 181 F. Supp. 124
(D. Md. 1960), was later affirmed, 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960), solely on the authority
of the Howard Johnson case mentioned above. Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp.
851 (D. Md. 1960), was decided by the same district judge who originally decided the
discredited Slack case. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541
(1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), did not consider the present question: Is it
possible for the State to vest in an entity of its own creation a power less limited than the
power of the State itself? It and the Slack case concerned themselves with whether or not
extraneous interplay between the State and the corporation was sufficient to make corporate
acts "State Action." Moreover, after Wilmington Parking Authority, the Stuyvesant case
speaks with a very soft voice indeed. In short, Respondent's cases fail to answer the funda-
mental question: Where did the corporation receive its power to discriminate?
" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 727 (1961).
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ness community and extending the meaning of "state action" to
encompass the acts of natural persons in their private capacities.
Such arguments misconceive the point. Petitioner does not argue
that because the state created the corporation, every act of the
corporation is itself State action. But every act of the corporation is
innately subject to the same constitutional limitations to which State
action is subject. The limits of this concept are perfectly obvious:
it affects nothing or no one that does not derive its very existence
solely from the State. This is not a matter of imposing a new restric-
tion on corporations. It is a matter of recognizing their inherent
incapacities. Nor does the concept force a corporation to do any
act. It merely restrains it from acting in an unconstitutional manner
if it acts.
This concept is not revolutionary. It evolves naturally from our
heritage and our law. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,3' developed this theme:
Every corporation created by a State is necessarily subject to the
supreme law of the land."9
Not even a State, still less one of its artificial creatures, can stand
in the way of its enforcement. If it were otherwise the government
and its laws might be prostrated at the feet of local authority."'
In 1952 Mr. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Professor of Law at Columbia
University and an eminent authority on corporations, gave his sup-
port to this concept:
The emerging principal appears to be that the corporation, itself
a creation of the State, is as subject to the constitutional limita-
tions which limit action as is the State itself.41
This concept in no way restricts the private right of the people to
discriminate on any basis. But it does say to those who would have
the State create a corporate entity for their private use: it is not
within the power of the State to create a vehicle for the achieve-
ment of private aims which is not subject to the constitutional
limitations of power to which the state itself is subject.
Any other conclusion enfeebles the Constitution and foreshadows
the emergence of a totalitarian state, for if the State may expand
its own powers by conferring upon a lesser entity the power to do
that which it cannot do itself, it is no longer subservient to the
3" 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
'Id. at 346.
40 193 U.S. at 333.
41 Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights
From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 942 (1952).
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people; it knows no bounds. Then will the supreme law of the land
be "prostrate at the feet of local authority." Wheat University, a
state-created corporation, cannot legally discriminate on the basis
of race.
C. The Public Interest
1. Education of the Populace
By providing academic education on an advanced level open to
the public and supported by the State, Wheat University has entered
the public domain, because formal education is of such paramount
public importance that it cannot escape the realm of the public
interest.
One of the great achievements of the American revolution was
the establishment of a system of free education. It was an outgrowth
of the doctrine, proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence,
that all men are created equal. The idea that education is of vital
importance to the progress of society and that it should be easily
accessible to everyone has been deemed so basic that terms providing
for the maintenance of a system of free education have been in-
corporated into the constitution of every state in the union, including
that of Rhea.
Education is considered by the State of Rhea to be so fundamen-
tally important that it compels its citizens within a certain age group
to attend school. Education is so highly affected with the public
interest that more public funds are spent for it than for any other
single item. Its character is so intertwined with the public welfare
that some states make educational achievement a prerequisite to
the right to vote.
Recent United States Supreme Court cases illustrate dramatically,
that the education of its citizens is a chief function of the state.
Brown v. Board of Education:
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our
most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship.'
Cooper v. Aaron added:
The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds . . . is
indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the con-
cept of due process of law.4"
Nor are these pronouncements any less appropriate here because
42 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
4'358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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the cases concerned state established public educational institutions
on the elementary or secondary school levels. The responsibility of
the state is to provide educational opportunities to its citizens, not
to provide them through a particular type of institution. If, for
practical administrative reasons, it chooses to discharge its responsi-
bilities through the medium of state-established schools, it is free to
do so. But it may use other methods, too. The fact that its responsi-
bility is discharged through another medium does not in any way
alter the character of the obligation it owes its citizens. In the
Pottsville area, the state's responsibility of providing adequate uni-
versity-level educational opportunity to its citizens is being dis-
charged by Wheat University with the cooperative acquiescence of
Rhea.
A very recent case, squarely in point, is Guillory v. Tulane Univ."'
In a yet unpublished opinion, the Court held that Tulane Univer-
sity, a privately established, 5 privately endowed school exercised a
public function in its educational capacity and that it might not
discriminate46 on the basis of race among applicants for admission
to its halls. The court said:
At the outset, one may question whether any school or college can
ever be so "private" as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . .institutions of learning are not things of purely private con-
cern. . . No one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected
with the greatest public interest. And this is true whether it is offered
by a public or private institution. . . .Clearly, the administrators of
44 - F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
45 Respondent seeks to distinguish the Tulane case on the basis that Tulane is a part of
the public school system of the State of Louisiana. Note the difference between the bulletin
of a state supported school and that of Tulane:
Bulletin of L.S.U. 51 (1959):
Tuition-$S25 semester
Activity fee-$35
Tulane Univ. Undergraduate Bulletin for 1959-60, 61 (1958):
As an independent university, without support from either church funds or
taxes, Tulane must meet its operating costs by income from three sources-
student fees, endowments, and gifts.
Id. at 62:
The tuition fee and total cost at Tulane are, of course, higher than those at
state-controlled institutions. . . . They will be found on the moderate side,
however, among universities comparable to Tulane-that is, other members of




" Guillory v. Tulane University, - F. Supp - (E.D. La. 1962), states:
A special Louisiana statute . . . apparently requires this discrimination. But
that law, and all such laws, must yield to the principle of equal treatment
announced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. The state can no




a private college are performing a public function. They do the work
of the state, often in the place of the state. Does it not follow
that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they not then
agents of the state, subject to the constitutional restraints on gov-
ernmental action ...
Reason and authority strongly suggest that the Constitution never
sanctions racial discrimination in our schools and colleges, no matter
how "private" they may claim to be.
But, as in the Tulane case, the facts "do not require us to go so
far." Here, the financial assistance given the University in the form
of tax exemptions as in the Tulane case make the interest of the state
clear. Not often has public support alone been sufficient to transform
private action into state action, but when such support is coupled
with other indications of the public interest, it becomes significant.
Here, other indications are present. When governmental supports
are extended to an institution which by its very nature is already
affected with the public interest, it must be assumed that this support
is given to help it discharge these quasi-public functions."
2. A Quasi-public Institution
Because there is no other state institution of higher learning in
Pottsville and the surrounding area, Petitioner cannot pursue his
right to an education in a state University without leaving home.
The purposeful planning of Rhea's educational system allows Wheat
University to fill the need for University education in that area.
This is the abdication of a public function by the State to the Uni-
versity. When abdication of a public function takes place, the
formerly private agency takes on a quasi-public character because it
is performing a public function.
Respondent evades this argument by contending that Wheat Uni-
versity is not a public corporation citing the Dartmouth College
case." However, the cases establish beyond a doubt that activity
by a private entity may so affect the paramount interest of the public
that it is the equivalent of state action. From the beginning the
principle has been clear that the mere private form of an organiza-
tion cannot change its public character if it exercises a public func-
tion. The First Bank of the United States was organized as a private
corporation under the "Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the
Bank of the United States." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
" Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950), relied upon by Respondent, presents no challenge to this view. Even
that case admits that it is a matter of degree. Here the financial assistance obtained by
Wheat University from, through, and because of the State of Rhea is decisive. Wheat per-
forms a public function.
48 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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the bank to be "a means of carrying into execution the powers of
the government." 9
Today Federal Reserve Banks are chartered as private corpora-
tions with stated capital, public stock subscription, stock certificates,
and dividends." Yet these banks have been held to be quasi-public
institutions because they perform a public function by exercising
immense control over the economic health of the nation.51 In brief,
they are "more than mere private corporations."5 When a private
organization performs a public function, as Wheat University does, it
is more than a mere private corporation, it is a quasi-public institution.
This same principle has been applied in many other areas. In the
field of labor relations, for example, unions have been denied the
right to discriminate in a union shop, because they perform a public
function. In James v. Marinship Corp.," the court said, "such a
union occupies a quasi-public position similar to that of a public
service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may
no longer claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by
golf clubs or fraternal associations.""
Because Wheat University performs a public function, it cannot
escape the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover,
Rhea may not abdicate its responsibility to educate its citizens by
allowing Wheat University free reign in the Pottsville area. If Rhea
so attempts, the University cannot escape its public character. Smith
v. Allwright" made it plain that a private political party can so
wield state-given power that its acts are proscribed by the four-
teenth amendment. Rice v. Elmore" extended the concept, and
Terry v. Adams57 held a private group accountable to the Constitu-
tion simply because the group performed a function designed to
discharge a state responsibility. Marsh v. Alabama" demonstrated
that when a private corporation assumes the discharge of a state
duty, the validity of its acts is measured by Constitutional limita-
tions on "State Action." 9 It is clear that when a state acquiesces in
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819).
5Cf. Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522
(1958).
"' Anderson v. Cronkleton, 32 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1929).
2 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking 5 552 (1938).
1325 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
" See Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
55 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
56 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
57 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
5 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
" As the Court said in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932), speaking of privately
organized institutions:
[T]hey are to be classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and
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the discharge of a public function by a private body, the private
organization is clothed with a character that makes its action the
equivalent of state action. It is regarded as a quasi-public institution.
The court below sought to avoid the necessity of deciding this
question by joining "the majority opinion in" Garner v. Louisiana"°
"in refusing to reach the constitutional issue." However, Petitioner's
rights are not so easily dismissed. Here the constitutional issue is
presented squarely to the court. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in
Garner,"' states the argument well:
One can close the doors of his home to anyone he desires. But one
who operates an enterprise under a license from the government enjoys
a privilege that derives from the people. . . . The business is not a
matter of mere private concern. Those who license enterprises for public
use should not have under our Constitution the power to license it
for the use of only one race. For there is the overriding constitutional
requirement that all state power be exercised so as not to deny equal
protection to any group.
Surely, it cannot be supposed that the public has greater interest in
the operation of a private restaurant than in the education of its
citizens.
The rationale which Petitioner offers to the court is in agreement
with even the most reserved analysis of the concept of state action.
St. Antoine suggests that the Shelley and Barrows cases be limited to
their facts."' Nonetheless, even his test brings Wheat's discrimination
within the bounds of state action. St. Antoine would make the
"nature of the private activity itself" controlling." The highest
public interest is the increase of the intelligence of mankind and
the fullest development of his capabilities. 4 That interest is achieved
principally through education. The conduct of such education by
Wheat University is a public function and therefore state action,
underscored by Rhea's financial support and acquiescence in Wheat's
conduct. The University cannot constitutionally be permitted to
discriminate in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
in such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their
actions.
60368 U.S. 157 (1961).
"Id. at 184-85.06 St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (1961).
63His test is, id. at 1011:
[Hias the state permitted . . . a private party to exercise such power over
matters of a high public interest that to render meaningful the type of rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment, the action of the private person or
organization must be deemed, for constitutional purposes, to be the action of
the state?
"4Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 33, 36 (1943).
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3. The "Right of Association"
Respondent seeks to defend its discrimination on the ground of
a supposed freedom of association or contract. These "freedoms"
cannot avail the University in the present situation, for equal pro-
tection of the laws is a higher constitutional right.
In California State Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney," the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the California
Assigned Risk Law which forced an insurance company, if it were
to do business in California, to enter a contract of insurance with
persons whom the company did not wish to insure. The company's
"freedom of contract" right gave way to the prevailing interest of
California in regulating the insurance industry within its borders.
If the freedom to contract with persons of one's choice is subordi-
nated in such a matter, a fortiori, it must give way to the dominant
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, which not even
a state may abridge. Any "freedom of contract" defense is frivolous.
Also, as a defense, Respondent asserted, on its own behalf and
that of its student body, "freedom of association"--the right to
choose with whom one will associate.
It is an easy matter to expose the fallacy of Respondent's con-
tention that it will be deprived of its right to associate with whom
it chooses. A corporation cannot associate, in the personal sense, with
anyone. Corporations are merely juristic persons and are not en-
titled to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment as to
the liberties guaranteed there. Only as to property rights are corpora-
tions considered persons within its scope. " Nor can vague statements
to the effect that Wheat University is a community of scholars
change the fact that it is a corporation. Its students are customers,
not members." The medieval concept of universitas" has been re-
jected by American law.
As to the alleged rights of present or future Wheat University
students to "freedom of association," it is quite doubtful that the
University has standing to assert them-whatever they are.
Moreover, the freedom of association protected by the federal con-
stitution is not the right to associate with whomever one pleases,
since the other person may not be agreeable to the association. The
freedom protected is a negative one: the right not to be prohibited
from associating with other persons of one's choice, and the right
"5341 U.S. 105 (1951).
0"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law S
573 (1956).
,7 Cf. 14 C.J.S. Colleges & Universities S 24 (1939).
08 91 C.J.S. Universitas 490 (1955).
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not to be forced to associate with anyone not of one's choice. The
injunction Petitioner requests will interfere with neither of these
rights because (1) other students will not at all be prohibited from
associating with anyone, and (2) no one is forced to attend Wheat
University and, incidentally, associate with Petitioner. "s
Respondent attempted below to establish the proposition that the
right to "freedom of association" is paramount to the right of
Petitioner not to be denied equal protection of the law because of
his race. The cases cited there to support the contention all con-
cerned social organizations, union groups, or purely private gatherings.
None of them, nor any that can be cited by Respondent to this
court, are germane-because the activity conducted by the group
was not so highly affected with a public interest that the acts of
the group amounted to state action, or because the innate inability
of the group legally to discriminate on the basis of race was not
adverted to, and, therefore, not decided. This is true of the few
published cases concerning private schools."0
"aCf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
"°Kirkpatrick v. Williams, 53 N.M. 477, 211 P.2d 506 (1949). Here plaintiff sought
admission to a beauticians school conducted by defendants. Obviously no public interest
existed here. Moreover this case did not involve a constitutional issue. The question was
whether there was a valid contract between the parties. The court found there was no meet-
ing of the minds, defendant not knowing that the plaintiff was a negro.
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909), did
not turn on a constitutional point. At issue was the procedural question whether man-
damus could be had against defendant. This question was decided in defendants favor. By
what is obviously pure dictum, the court also recognized claims of the nature here advanced
by respondents. It must also be observed that this decision dates from the year 1909 and
was made long before the concept of state action was developed to its present status.
Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. (1948). This is a decision
antedating the expansion of the state action concept. Also it involves a vocational school
in which no particular public interest existed.
Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1959), involved
a case of a five year old Negro girl seeking admission to a private school with a highly
specialized curriculum having heavy emphasis on the performing arts. Again, this was a
case involving an absence of a public interest in so specialized a field of education. Moreover
the case essentially turned on the narrow question whether under the California Civil Rights
Statute a private school is "a place of public accommodation." This the court refused to find.
In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570
(1958). Respondent cannot derive comfort from the fact that the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari after having reversed the original decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, sub nom. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City
Trusts, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), and remanded it, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). In the
original proceeding two Negro boys were seeking admission to Girard College simply on the
theory that Girard College was a public institution being administered by an instrumentality
of the City of Philadelphia, so that discrimination by a public agency would constitute
state action. Upon remand the court vacated its original decision and remanded to the
Orphan's Court, which, strictly on principles of the law of trusts, removed the Board
of Directors of City Trusts as trustee, replacing it with 13 private individuals in order to
prevent the trust from being frustrated. When reviewing this decision of the Orphan's
Court, the Pennsylvania Court, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, 847 (1958), observed that the
Supreme Court had not ordered admission of the plaintiffs. Therefore the court rightfully
said that as we read it the Supreme Court's opinion held only that the refusal to admit
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Petitioner submits that the action of Wheat University in denying
him admission to the University was clearly state action denying
him equal protection of the laws; his rights under the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States are not subordi-
nate to the right of a corporation to contract freely and his admis-
sion to the student body of the University would in no way derogate
any other right of any person, real or fictional.
D. Summary
Petitioner does not seek to compel his admission to Wheat Uni-
versity. He seeks to restrain its denial on the illegal basis of race.
Race is an illegal basis on which such denial can be made because:
(1) the corporation, Wheat University, possesses only powers derived
from the state and the state itself does not possess the legal power
to discriminate on that basis; (2) the State of Rhea has abdicated
in favor of Wheat University the discharge of a public function-
the providing of adequate advance-level educational opportunity for
citizens of the Pottsville area-which must be discharged in a manner
providing equal protection of the laws; and (3) education is affected
with a public interest of such magnitude that it may not be ad-
ministered with a disregard for the rights protected by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The reasons advanced below for not vindicating the rights of
Petitioner were: (1) hardship to the University; (2) impairment of
contract; (3) freedom of contract; and (4) freedom of association.
Whether or not hardship will be, in fact, visited upon Wheat
University because Petitioner's rights are enforced, is entitled to no
weight, but, nevertheless, no hardship will result therefrom because
the reverter Wheat fears cannot legally operate.
There can be no impairment of a void contract, and the charter-
contract provision to the effect that Wheat University may only
admit Caucasian students is void.
It is well established that the freedom to contract only with whom
plaintiffs was incompatible with the administration of the trust by a public agency.
(Emphasis added.) The court found (at 848) that Girard College was not actually a
"college," but an Orphan's institution where the boys received room, board, and incidentally,
instruction. The institution provided a substitute for a home. It was not primarily an educa-
tional institution.
Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1947). Here plaintiff
was not refused admission on account of race or color. As a matter of fact, the applicant
was of the white race. In earlier litigation plaintiff had been refused admission on account
of age (he was then only fifteen years old). Later admission was sought again but refused
on account of the University's finding that the student's character disqualified him. It is
well established that the equal protection clause permits reasonable classifications. The
classification was apparently a reasonable one.
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one chooses must give way to superior rights. Petitioner's right to
equal protection of the laws is such a superior right.
A corporation has no "right to free association" in the personal
sense. Such rights exist in natural persons but they are of a negative
nature. One has the right not to be prohibited from associating with
others of his choice who desire such company, and one has the right
not to be forced to associate with anyone not of his choice. Petitioners'
admission would interfere with neither right, because no one would
be prohibited from associating with anyone, and no one would be
forced to attend Wheat University.
In conclusion, Petitioner does not ask for an extension of Shelley
v. Kraemer, nor does he ask the court to create new law. He asks
merely for the application of legal principles long existing, some of
which, it may be, have lain dormant as to the particular question
presented here, but which are still touchstones of the law.
II. THE CASE FOR SEGREGATION
A. Private Action Versus State Action
The doctrine that the fourteenth amendment applies only to
state action was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
the Civil Rights Cases,"' when it said:
It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. In-
dividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
amendment.
The Supreme Court has never deviated from this doctrine. In the
more recent case of Shelley v. Kraemer," the Court reaffirmed its
holding that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."
Petitioner does not directly attempt to contest this well estab-
lished interpretation of the fourteenth amendment; he seeks ingen-
iously to avoid it. He asserts that a private educational institution
is in fact a quasi-governmental body and that its acts are thus the
acts of the state. The facts and the law in no way substantiate this
contention.
The question before this court is not whether integration of
private colleges is or is not morally desirable; rather, it is whether a
private institution must be compelled to admit individuals which it
(for its own reasons) chooses not to admit. Upon the facts, before
the court today, the law clearly answers, "No!"
71109 U.S. 3,11 (1883).
72334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
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1. Wheat University Is a Bona Fide Private Institution in Every
Characteristic and Is Not Being Used by the State as a Subterfuge
It is undisputed that the university was organized by private in-
dividuals as a private institution. There are no facts alleged, even by
implication, which indicate that the State of Rhea is using Wheat
University as a subterfuge to disguise its own action. In fact, the
State of Rhea has an extensive system of public institutions of higher
learning.73 There are ninety-five universities, colleges, and junior col-
leges in the State of Rhea. Of these, fifty-one are public schools,
supported by the state or its subdivisions. The petitioner has a legal
right to attend any of these public colleges." Most of these are
presently integrated.
Of the forty-four private institutions of higher learning, nine
were established primarily for Negroes. Of the remaining thirty-five,
many have voluntarily admitted Negroes. Negroes have a variety of
institutions of higher learning, both public and private, open to
them in this state. Wheat University is not a sham created by the
State in order to prevent the desegregation of public institutions of
higher learning in Rhea. Thus, cases such as Cooper v. Aaron," are
clearly not in point. Wheat University is still exactly what it has
always been for thirty-eight years-a private institution of higher
learning.
2. A Private Educational Corporation Is Not an Instrument of the
State by the Fact of Its Incorporation or of the Public Service It
Performs
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"' has been called,
"to all intents and purposes a part of the Constitution itself."7 In
that case, Mr. Justice Story distinguished between private and public
corporations in the following language:
The fact, then, that the charity is public, affords no proof that the
corporation is also public; and, consequently the argument, so far as
it is built on this foundation, falls to the ground. If, indeed, the argu-
ment were correct, it would follow that almost every hospital and
college would be a public corporation; a doctrine utterly irreconcilable
with the whole current of decisions since the time of Lord Coke.
When the corporation is said . . . to be public, it is not merely
meant that the whole community may be proper objects of the bounty,
but that the government have the sole right, as trustees of the public
"a See Educational Directory, United States Dep't of Health, Education, Welfare, Part 3,
169-77 (1961-1962).
"'Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75358 U.S. 1 (1958).
7617 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
17 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 816 (1879).
[Vol. 16
1962] COMMENTS
interests, to regulate, control, and direct the corporation, and its funds
and its franchises, at its own good will and pleasure. Now such au-
thority does not exist in the government, except where the corporation
is in the strictest sense public; that is, where its whole interests and
franchises are the exclusive property and domain of the government
itself."8
This landmark case clearly illustrates that mere incorporation of
a college to perfom a public or charitable purpose does not make
that educational corporation a public one. The language also defines
the large degree of state control required to transform such a private
corporation into a public corporataion. Wheat University is as inde-
pendent of the control of the State of Rhea as is any other private
citizen or private corporation in the state.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Compel Desegregation of
Private Schools
Respondent submits that no court in the United States, either state
or federal, has held that desegregation of private schools is com-
pelled by the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme
Court in the Segregation Cases was very careful to restrict its de-
cision to public education. Moreover, in every case in which the
issue has arisen, it has been held that an individual is not denied a
constitutional right by a private educational institution which re-
fuses to admit him because of his race or any other reason."' The
78 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 671. (Emphasis added.)
" Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948);
Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1959); People ex rel.
Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 333 Il1. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1947); State ex rel
Clark v. Maryland Institution for Promotion of Mechanic Arts, 87 Md. 643, 41 Atl. 126
(1898); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
The rationale of these decisions is that no state action is involved in discrimination
by a private educational institution and that the fourteenth amendment therefore is in-
applicable.
Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra, involved the refusal of the
Maryland Institute to admit Negroes. The City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland
supplied a large amount of financial assistance to this school, which included: a site and a
contribution of $20,000 for the building from the city, the rebuilding of this building
by the city after a fire with $190,000 of civic funds, $25,000 per annum from city
contracts to educate certain students, low rentals on city buildings, a $3,000 per annum
grant from the state, and a donation by the state of $175,000 toward the construction
of an additional campus.
Nonetheless, in denying the plaintiff's application on the grounds that there was no
state action, Judge Chestnut in a sharply analyzed opinion stated:
In this case the discrimination was made by the Maryland Institute, a
Maryland Corporation. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether its action
constituted private or public conduct. If the institute is a private corporation,
then its conduct is also private. The legal test between a private and a public
corporation is whether the corporation is subject to control by public authori-
ty. ...
Id. at 456. (Emphasis added.)
Unlike the Maryland Institute, Wheat University did not receive any direct, special
financial assistance from any agency of the state. Wheat University is even further removed
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present day United States Supreme Court is well aware of the
existing public-private distinction, yet it has refused to consider
cases which would alter this dichotomy."0
Petitioner maintains that the recent case of Guillory v. Tulane
Univ."5 breaks through the public-private dichotomy in the field
of higher education. Despite the district judge's broad (and un-
necessary) dictum, his holding is clearly based upon the public nature
of that institution. Judge Wright found the following circumstances
upon which the holding is based. Tulane was initially a state univer-
sity, and after a statutory change to take advantage of a private grant,
it continued to operate in its original buildings on state land. Even
after this change, the Supreme Court of Louisiana continued to con-
sider it a public school.8 " In addition, it was found that Tulane received
a unique tax exemption not extended to other private schools in
the state. Its governing board included three high public officials. 3
Other factors such as continued acts of control and regulation by
the state over the school were also found to be present. The "public
school" nature of Tulane is clear. It is either a segregated public
school or a subterfuge for one. The facts of the case at bar are far
removed from those in the case of the Tulane University of Louisiana.
4. There Are Five Basic Categories in Which State Action Has Been
Found To Exist, but None Is Applicable to the Facts Before This
Court
All the cases relied upon by petitioner fit into one of the five basic
categories discussed below and all are clearly distinguishable from the
case at bar. Respondent agrees that these cases do in fact constitute
state action, but the case at bar has none of the essentials relied
upon by courts therein to find state action.
a. Direct Action by the State Through Its Officials, Agents,
Agencies, and Sub-divisions.-Found in this category are the public
from state control and consequent state action.
In People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., supra, the question before the Illinois
appellate court was Northwestern's rejection of a qualified candidate for admission. This case
did not involve racial discrimination. The court upheld the right of the University to reject
anyone they saw fit, stating, id. at 348:
To say that the University though a private corporation is affected with a
public interest is to beg the question. Those corporations are affected with a
public interest which are amenable to State supervision. We cannot say that a
private educational institution is in a business essentially public in its nature
rendering the corporation so engaged subject to public control ...
" E.g., it had an excellent opportunity in the Girard College cases and did not. See In re
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
" - F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
SaSee Administrators of Tulane Univ. v. Board of Assessors, 38 La. Ann. 292 (1886).




school cases, Brown v. Board of Education," and its successors. That
this line of cases is clearly inapplicable here has been practically con-
ceded by petitioner. However, petitioner maintains that acceptance
by Rhea of a charter of a private education corporation, with a pro-
vision limiting the educational charity to only one race, is per se
discrimination by the state.
The mere granting of a charter does not make the acts of a cor-
poration the acts of a state. The fourteenth amendment stands
only for the proposition that equal protection and due process
cannot be denied by the states. However, the amendment does not
prevent the state from allowing private corporations to discriminate;"
it prohibits only affirmative action.
The presence or absence of a discriminatory charter provision is
immaterial to the issue in this case. The discriminatory act com-
plained of here is the private institution's denial of admittance to
a Negro. It may take this action in the absence of such a charter
provision. That chartering of special charitable institutions is not
prohibited by law is indicated in In re Girard College Trusteeship."
There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that probating of the
will (the necessary judicial act for its effectuation) which set up a
trust for poor male white orphans was not the type of state action
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment because:
No one who does not come within the settlor's definition of bene-
ficiary has a constitutionally protected right (or any right for that
matter) to share in the charity's benefits.87
Equal protection of the law is in fact now being granted to all
84347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); Slack v.
Atlantic White Tower, 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 284 F.2d 746 (4th
Cir. 1960); Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960); Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949); Madden v. Queens County
Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947).
88391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
8 Prior to this decision, the high Court in Pennsylvania v. Board of City Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957), had held that administration of the trust by city officials was state action
violating the fourteenth amendment. Whereupon, the probate court replaced the Board of
City Trusts with private individuals as trustees in order to carry out the discriminatory in-
tention of the testator. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the quoted case upheld this
action, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, allowing the discrimination
to continue.
There was a greater exercise of the state's sovereign power in this cy pres decision than
in granting a charter under general statutory provisions. But the probate of the will and
cy Pres maintenance of a discriminatory testamentary trust by the state are analogous to
state acceptance of a charitable corporation's charter limiting the charity to a particular race.
Contrary to the usual situation, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the second
Girard case is of interest. The Court had originally found unconstitutional state action. If
it did not agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding, surely it would not allow




by the State of Rhea. No state law makes discriminatory provisions
in a charter mandatory or prevents the granting of charter to inte-
grated associations. Any group can file a charter under which it
undertakes to help its own group, or some other group, or all groups.
Nothing could be closer to the spirit and ideals of the American
system than to grant to all groups equal freedom in this respect. The
State of Rhea has, in its grant of a charter to Wheat University and
in its policy to treat all groups in similar fashion, afforded the equal
protection it owes to all persons and associations of persons in our
society.
Charities chartered to aid a particular racial, ethnic, or national
group are well established in our law."s If Petitioner's contention
were correct, a charity could not even incorporate to aid petitioner's
race, the Negroes. Such a result would be absurd! There has never
been any question of the legitimate purpose of the state in effectuat-
ing the charitable aims of its people. Private education is certainly a
valid and worthy charity to uphold."
Persons are guaranteed freedom of association under the four-
teenth amendment." The State of Rhea has merely allowed the uni-
versity to change its form of organization from an unincorporated
association to a corporate association. The discrimination is the same.
The right to discriminate in private association is sanctioned by the
Constitution regardless of the form of that association."'
The common understanding of the distinction between state and
private action must not be cast aside. All private action is state action
only under a communist society. Unlike a communistic society, our
democratic federal system recognizes sharp distinction between state
and private action. Once the common understanding of what is state
or private action is disregarded the veriest individual action will
eventually be considered to be that of the state. The private corpora-
tion in the twentieth century has become the major structure through
which private men organize to pursue their private aims. The dis-
tinction between action by the state and action by private groups
within the state must be made and maintained. The dam that has
been erected to protect the private segment of our society must not
be shattered.
b. Basic State Function Performed by a Private Group as a
'8 See, e.g., San Antonio v. Board of Missions, - Tex. -, 341 S.W.2d 896 (1960),
where the court effectuated the purpose of the donor in a charitable trust for a specific
nationality, namely the Chinese.
" See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
' See Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"' See text accompanying notes 119-41 infra.
[Vol. 16
COMMENTS
Subterfuge.-The most classic example of this category is the series
of cases involving party primaries, of which the recent Texas case
of Terry v. Adams (jaybird Party)" is one. Elections, being essential
to a democratic society are properly an exclusive function of the
state-not so with education. Though education is a service pro-
vided by the state, it has never been deemed wise that education
should be solely a state function. A corporation organized for edu-
cational purposes was recognized in 1819 as a private function in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward." The value of private
education as a supplement to public education, rather than a part
of public education, was firmly established in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters."4 It has already been made clear that Wheat University is not a
subterfuge for the state's educational function as was the situation
in Cooper v. Aaron.5
c. Exclusive or Monopolistic Rights Granted by State to Private
Groups To Perform Public Functions.-These cases all involve a
monopolistic grant of power to a private group. Exercise of power
of this nature is generally regulated by governmental authority in
order to insure adequate performance of the public function for
which it was granted."
Wheat University has been granted no power to act in a particular
monopolistic manner." There are ninety-four other educational
institutions in the state. Wheat University is not regulated or
managed in any way by the State of Rhea. The only educational
standards with which Wheat University must comply are those
established by the voluntary associations of colleges to which it
belongs.
The cases of Steele v. Louisville FS N.R.R.,9 and Oliphant v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Eng'rs,"9 clearly illustrate the
point involved here. The Steele case held that a union certified under
92345 U.S. 461 (1953).
03 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518.
14 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
95 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
9 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960), involved state en-
forcement of a segregated seating rule of a bus company with exclusive franchise for the
city's bus service. The court held that the state could not enforce this seating rule. How-
ever, even in this situation, where there was no other bus service available, due to the state
action in granting the exclusive franchise, the court, id. at $35, stated that the maintenance
of such a rule by the company alone would not involve state action denying constitutional
rights.
" But even if a monopoly or exclusive grant were involved, the Boman case still holds
there would be no unconstitutional discrimination, for it is not necessary to use the police
power of the State for Wheat University to refuse to register any student whom it does
not wish to matriculate.
95323 U.S. 192 (1944).
99262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
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the Railway Labor Act... as exclusive bargaining agent must repre-
sent all employees in the bargaining unit without discrimination. The
dictum in the Steele case, that this holding did not require a private
union to admit anyone to membership, was affirmed when that precise
question was raised in the Oliphant case under the fifth amendment."'
d. Invoking Affirmative State Action To Cause Discrimination.-
Wheat University, as the defendant in this cause, has not invoked
positive or affirmative relief. In Shelley v. Kraemer,"' state action was
found only because the party seeking to enforce the restrictive
covenant necessarily had to seek the aid of the courts of the state
to achieve enforcement of the covenant.' Even the Shelley case
recognized that voluntary adherence to the restrictive covenant is
lawful. In the situation before the bench, the University need never
invoke the aid of the Courts of Rhea in order to prevent students,
which it wishes to exclude, from enrolling.'
0 4
The Supreme Court of Maryland recently held that no state dis-
criminatory action was involved in criminal prosecution for dis-
orderly conduct of Negroes seeking admittance to a segregated
private park."' The court stated as to the prosecution:
It was at least one step removed from State enforcement of a policy
of segregation and violated no constitutional right of appellants.0 '
10148 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1958).
101 Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
... Compare Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). Here the North Carolina court found
a limitation in a grant of land for public park purposes restricting use to the white race
only to be a valid fee simple determinable. Under the law of that state, this grant would
revert automatically, without intervention of the state judiciary, if Negroes should use the
land. Shelley v. Kraemer was said, therefore, to have no application.
14 Petitioner places emphases on the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). This case involved arrests of Negro sit-inners at drug store
lunch counters in Louisiana for breach of the peace. The convictions were reversed by the
majority of the Court on the ground of lack of evidentiary support for the verdict, and the
constitutional question of state action was not reached. Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion found state action involved in the discrimination because of the overwhelming sup-
port the state gave to the custom of segregation in the state. This concurring opinion, though
enunciating an interesting doctrine of state action without state action, is not applicable here
because (i) this opinion was not the law of the Garner case, (ii) this opinion does not ex-
press the holding of any other case decided by any court in our entire judicial system at
any time, (iii) this opinion is directed at the peculiar state of affairs existing in Louisiana,
which differs appreciably from that in the State of Rhea, and (iv) there is no breach of
the peace or trespass enforcement (or any other kind of legal action) involved in our case.
However, Garner, supra, and Barringer, supra note 103, do aid in a logical analysis of
where the situation of Wheat University should be placed in a logical progression of the
Shelley decision. Any state action in Garner and Barringer comes after the discriminatory
event has taken place; and such state action is apart from the discrimination and does not
effectuate it, though it arises because of the discrimination. Therefore, Garner and Barringer
are at least one important step removed from Shelley, in which the action of the state was
required to effectuate the discrimination.
's' Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961).
10 Id. at 345.
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Other state and federal courts have made the same distinction where
the action of the state is thus separated and unconnected with the
discrimination. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will nullify
this distinction."0 7
e. Control of Private Individual or Group by State Through
Management and Direct and Extensive Financial Support.-Tax ex-
emption benefits given to a private educational and charitable in-
stitution do not give the state such control over the private institu-
tion as to make its action state action.
Wheat University has received all of its income from private
donations or tuition paid by private parties. No property of any
nature has been received from the state. Apart from the federal loan,
the only financial aid Wheat University has received from govern-
mental units has been the general tax exemption extended to other
schools, churches, hospitals, and similar charitable organizations. The
purpose of such exemptions is to encourage the private undertaking
of such activities. No discrimination by the state is involved where
these same benefits are available to any similar private institution
without restriction as to whom they can serve. Non-discrimination
is the policy of Rhea tax exemptions, not discrimination.
The extent to which the courts have refused to hold that financial
aid to an institution gives the state such control over it as to make
its actions state action exposes the flimsy nature of petitioner's con-
tention regarding tax exemptions.
Maiatico Constr. Co. v. United States.. asserted:
[T]he generosity of the government is not enough in itself to change
the character of the corporation from private to public.' 0
107 But note that our situation is one more important step removed from Garner, Bar-
ringer and Drews, and thus two giant steps from Shelley, since no state action whatsoever
is required to effectuate or to enforce a denial of matriculation by Wheat University.
'0079 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (193 5).
" This case may be particularly appropriate because it involves a predominately colored
university, and the issue was not one pertaining to race relations. Federal statutes required
that a bond be executed by contractors on construction of public work. Congress made a
large annual appropriation for construction, maintenance, and development of Howard Uni-
versity, including payment of the personnel, and it contracted for the erection of the build-
ings. In a suit claimed to be on the contractor's bond required by statute, the question was
whether Howard University had lost its private character.
The court found that Howard University had retained its private character and said,
id. at 421:
Congress has passed no law giving . . . any . . . officer of the government
control of the University, and we think it obvious that it could not do so
without the consent and approval of the corporate authorities of that institu-
tion. Hence, in the view we take, the generosity of the government is not
enough in itself to change a private into a public institution. (Emphasis
added.)
See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently upheld the
exclusion of Negro M.D.'s from courtesy staff privileges in a North
Carolina hospital. The exclusion was made solely because of their
race. In this case, Eaton v. James Walker Memorial Hosp.,"' the
land upon which the hospital stood had been acquired by the city
and county."' Aid received was from a contract for services rendered
to county indigent patients. It is interesting that this case was
decided by the same circuit which had earlier decided Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library."2 Note how the court carefully distinguishes
the cases:
In short, it was shown that the Library was so completely sub-
sidized by the City that in practical effect its operations were subject
to the City's control. In the pending case, as we have shown, the hos-
pital is neither owned nor controlled by the municipalities and the
revenues derived from them on a contract basis amount to less than
4V2 per cent of its total income."'
Financial assistance alone is not sufficient to turn private action
into state action. A large degree of control, accompanying the
financial assistance, is required. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,"
indicated the great extent to which a state can regulate and supply
financial assistance to a corporation it has chartered without achieving
such control as to have the acts of the private corporation constitute
state action. There the New York Court of Appeals decided that a
private corporation which had received considerable government aid
was privileged to exclude Negroes from consideration as tenants in
Stuyvesant Town apartments owned by the corporation."'
"0261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
.. The hospital had been operated under municipal authority from 1881 to 1901, at
which time, to take advantage of a private donation, it was conveyed to trustees of a pri-
vate corporation. However, for fifty years thereafter it received financial help from the
city and county.
"2 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
"3 261 F.2d at 527.114299 N.Y. 12, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
".. The state assistance and regulation of Stuyvesant Town Corp. included the following:
incorporation under a special law designed to encourage housing redevelopment, a declara-
tion by the corporation that it was organized to serve a public purpose and would remain
subject to governmental supervision and regulation; adoption of a contract by the City of
New York to initiate the Stuyvesant Town apartment project with full knowledge that
the corporation reserved the right to select tenants and would pursue a discriminatory policy
in that regard; subsequent approval of the contract by the State Superintendent of Insurance
and the Board of Estimate of New York State; maximum rents and profits fixed by the
government; government limitations on financing, mortgaging, altering, or selling of the
property; exemption from ad valorem taxes on improvements; use of the city's eminent
domain power to secure the 18 city blocks for the 35 apartment houses; transferring and
rearranging of city streets to accommodate the project; and ultimate reversion of Stuyvesant
Town Corp. surplus assets to the public on dissolution.
COMMENTS
A dissenting justice believed that Marsh v. Alabama,"' was ap-
plicable, but the majority distinguished it and stated:
To say that the aid accorded respondents is nevertheless subject to
these requirements [Fourteenth Amendment limits on state action]
on the ground that helpful cooperation between the State and the re-
spondents transforms the activities of the latter into State action,
comes perilously close to asserting that any state assistance to an
organization which discriminates necessarily violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Stuyvesant Town Corp. was brought into being under special
statutory provisions under which it was closely regulated. The pro-
ject was made possible by contract with the City, it was a geographic
entity created through the City's use of eminent domain, and it
was an economic entity aided by the City. Yet its private nature
was upheld and no state action was found by the highest court of
New York, a state which has been in the forefront in the fight
against discrimination. General tax exemptions to an education in-
stitution, especially where not steeped with the public purpose in-
volved in Stuyvesant, are far removed from the financial aid and
control required to transform private action into state action.'
There is no control of Wheat University by the State of Rhea. No
control over the management of the University has passed from the
trustees of Wheat University into the hands of the government by
the acceptance of these general tax exemption benefits. An argument
for state action based on tax exemption benefits is unfounded.
B. Freedom Of Association
1. The Right of a Private Association To Admit Only Members of
Its Own Choosing Has Been Repeatedly Established
There is no legal precedent for compelling Wheat University to
admit petitioner to its private community. In fact, the right of a
16 326 U.S. 501 (1956).
17 87 N.E.2d at 541.
"' For other cases holding that financial aid (and regulation) by governmental units
to private groups did not change their private nature see Barnes v. City of Gadsen, 260
F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1960) (state financial benefits to
urban renewal project which discriminated); Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp.
851 (D. Md. 1960) (water and sewage disposal service furnished to housing developer who
discriminated); Mitchell v. Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957) (boys club which
discriminated aided by police in fund raising, supervision during duty hours, and other ways,
and allowed to use certain abandoned fire stations in the District with water, heat, and light
furnished by the District); Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451
(D. Md. 1948) (large financial grants and assistance to private school from city and state);
Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (1958) (granting of state and munici-
pal aid); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1961) (hos-
pital received grants of public funds and exemption from taxation); West Coast Hosp. v.
Hoare, 6 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953) (grants of public funds); Levin v. Sinai Hosp.,
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private association to select its own members on the basis of its own
requirements has been repeatedly established."9
A case which clearly indicates the vitality and strength of this
right of a private association to choose its own associates is Oliphant
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Eng'rs."'5 In this case Negro
firemen brought an action to compel the union to admit them to
membership. The union had been certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative, and its constitution forbade the admission of Negroes
to membership. Even though the federal government had stripped
the plaintiffs of their bargaining privileges as individuals and con-
ferred that function upon a majority elected representative, over
which the individual plaintiff had no direct control and in which he
was not eligible for membership, the court still held that the dis-
crimination by the union was not state action:
The Brotherhood is a private association, whose membership policies
are its own affair, and this is not an appropriate case of interposition
of judicial control."'
A hardship was imposed upon these Negro firemen by the federal
government's action in conferring exclusive bargaining authority
upon a union in which they could not gain membership. Still, the
right of a private association to select its own members according to
its own standards was held inviolate. Our situation involves no such
hardship, for no special authority has been conferred on Wheat Uni-
versity. There are many other educational institutions of equal
quality in our state which petitioner is free to attend.
The right of private associations to choose their own members is
basic in our society. Moreover, it is protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
2. It Is Beyond Debate That Freedom To Engage in Association for
the Advancement of Beliefs and Ideas Is an Inseparable Aspect of
the "Liberty" Assured by the Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth
Amendment
186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (supported in part by public funds); Van Campen v.
Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E.
219 (1925) (although exempted from taxation).
s"North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938); Cline v. In-
surance Exch., 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1942); Manning v. The San Antonio Club,
63 Tex. 166 (1885); Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriquez, 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944-San Antonio) error ref.; Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920-Amarillo) no writ hist.; see Mayer v. Stone Cutter's Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519,
20 At. 49: (1890); McKane v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 123 N.Y. 609, 25 N.E. 1057
(1890).
"0°262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
12 Id. at 363.
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The above heading is a quotation from NAACP v. Alabama.122
The court pointed out that this freedom exists whether it pertains to
political, economic, religious, or cultural matters."' This freedom of
association is essential to the unhampered exercise of the enumerated
first amendment freedoms. The "close nexus" between association
and these freedoms has indeed been recognized by the Court.124
The only way for petitioner to gain admittance to Wheat Uni-
versity is for the state, through state action, to compel admittance.
Respondent respectfully submits that a judicial mandate forcing
admission of any student upon the private association of persons
who collectively comprise Wheat University will be, in itself, a
violation of their freedom of association. This freedom is protected
against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Such a mandate by this court would be affirmative state
action."5
The value of private educational institutions and the reality of
their private rights has been clearly recognized in such notable
Supreme Court decisions as Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward,2' and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'27 A corollary to the right
to conduct private schools, if it is to have any meaning, is that the
schools have a right to be private. To achieve such privacy the Board
of Trustees of a school must have the right to admit whomever they
wish. To deny the right of Wheat University to refuse matriculation
on its own standards would be to deny the right of a community of
scholars to associate freely together in the pursuance of educa-
tional or cultural matters. This right is protected by the fourteenth
amendment.2 '
The fact that the particular standards around which an association
is formed (in our case a limitation of the association to members of
the Caucasian race) are controversial or debatable as to their moral
correctness does not decrease the strength of this right. In fact, the
right thereby takes on more vitality. In NAACP v. Alabama, the
court stated:
122357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
123 See Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960), stating:
We deal with a constitutional right, since freedom of association is in-
cluded in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to the
States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
114 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In regard to this emerging constitu-
tional right see Solter, Freedom of Association-A New and Fundamental Civil Right,
27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1959).
.2. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
126 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
127268 U.S. 510 (1925).
128NAACP v. Alabama, 337 U.S. 449 (1958).
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group as-
sociation, as this court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly ...
Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced
by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural mat-
ters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.1"9
The private group of interested persons who donated their time,
efforts, and finances to the organization of Wheat University did
so with the intent of creating an educational and cultural community
limited to Caucasians. Other persons through the years have contri-
buted their time, efforts, and financial support to this institution
with reliance on its original nature and purposes. The faculty mem-
bers accept their position in the community with full knowledge of
its composition. Students come to Wheat in order to associate with
the educational community there. Whatever their reasons, the free-
dom of association of the members of various segments of this edu-
cational community is in question before this court today.
The free men who comprise the community that is Wheat Uni-
versity are gathered together for free discussion of political, eco-
nomic, religious, and cultural matters. Their freedom to make their
own cultural choices as to their associations and to continue their
association, which inescapably involves the constant examination
and promulgation of beliefs and ideas, is inviolate under the four-
teenth amendment.
Can it be maintained that a state may, in the guise of prohibiting
discrimination, seriously impair the rights of citizens to associate
with those of their choosing? Respondent thinks not. But that would
be the result of granting petitioner's plea.
3. A Private Educational Corporation Has Standing To Assert the
Constitutional Right to Freedom of Association of Those Within
Its Community, and, Furthermore, Has Standing To Assert These
Rights Because of Its Own Interest in Protecting Its Enrollment, Its
Financial Support, and Its Existing Property
Petitioner seeks to question the standing of the Trustees of Wheat
University to raise the question of freedom of association for its
founders, its sustainers through the years, and its faculty and stu-
dents. However, this question was foreclosed by NAACP v. Alabama.
There the Court stated:
12Id. at 460. (Emphasis added.)
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To require that it [their constitutional rights] be claimed by the
members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the
very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to
assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical
sense identical.1
30
The NAACP in that case was representing the rights of contribu-
tors to and members of an association organized in corporate form.
Similarly, the constitutional rights of the members of the Wheat Uni-
versity community cannot be effectively vindicated except through
their appropriate representative. The Board of Trustees is the focal
point of this community of scholars and speaks in its behalf. In assert-
ing the right of the community to organize around the basic standards
upon which it was founded, the Board is in every practical sense
identical with the community and is its appropriate representative. 3
A decision forcing Wheat University to admit petitioner would
destroy the constitutional rights of the sustainers and members of
this academic community. Such a decision would be res judicata as
to any action they might later bring. Their rights must be protected
now or never.
Wheat University can also assert the constitutional rights of its
members to freedom of association because of its property interests.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters"' the Court stated:
Appellees are corporations and therefore, it is said, they cannot
claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. . . .But they
have business and property for which they claim protection. These
are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion
which appellants are exercising over present and prospective patrons
of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against
loss threatened by such action.
The reliance of donors to Wheat University upon its Caucasian
character is clear from the facts. Students and faculty have chosen
to associate in a university of this character. Only a "reasonable
likelihood" that Wheat University might have diminished financial
support in the future need be shown for it to have standing to assert
the constitutional rights of its sustainers and members under NAACP
v. Alabama."
"'.357 U.S. at 459.
13 The NAACP's standing to sue for the rights of its members was upheld and
further clarified in Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 295, 296 (1961). Mr. Justice Douglas
stated: "The NAACP is a New York corporation .... " "It is clear from our decisions
that the NAACP has standing to assert the constitutional rights of its members."
'32268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
3357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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But, should petitioner's alleged right be upheld, respondent is very
likely to lose the fifty acre tract donated to it in 1936, together
with the classroom buildings and men's dormitories located thereon.
Petitioner claims that no reversion would take place due to Shelley
v. Kraemer.3' However, the Shelley case only applies to judicial
enforcement of discriminatory covenants. Here a determinable fee
is involved. It will terminate automatically, without court enforce-
ment, at the very instant petitioner is admitted to Wheat Univer-
sity. Any judicial decree as to title will be to uphold a title that has
already vested by the reversion. The provision in the deed for re-
version is not void ab initio, for Shelley states that a discriminatory
covenant is valid. By analogy, so are discriminatory deed provisions.
The distinction involved between court enforcement of discrimi-
natory covenants and the valid operation of reverters in determinable
fee provisions was cogently drawn in Charlotte Park &q Recreation
Comm'n v. Barringer."' A determinable fee provision similar to the
one involved here was held valid in that case. No case of which
respondent is aware has held to the contrary.
Petitioner cites Guillory v. Tulane Univ."' as an identical case
sustaining his position. That Judge Wright did not purport to decide
the validity of the reversion in that case is pointed out in his sixth
footnote:
Whether non-compliance with the condition would support an
action for rescission of the donations is a state law question which this
court need not decide.
The state law in Rhea recognizes that a determinable fee reverts at
the instant of the condition specified without any judicial enforce-
ment."' This law does not discriminate in violation of the fourteenth
amendment but merely prescribes the nature of a particular interest
in private property, the possibility of reverter."'
Whatever dispute may exist as to the limit of the thrust of Shelley,
or as to its interpretation, or as to the validity of Barringer, the fact
that the outcome of these disputes is unsettled puts Wheat Univer-
sity in danger of losing this valuable property should a decision
adverse to the rights of association of its members be rendered.
Therefore, Respondent has standing to assert the constitutional
134 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"'s242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
I3O - F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
13E.g., Cragin v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 164 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942-San
Antonio) error ref.
"'See In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1955), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958), for a similar distinction between state action which de-
termines private property interests and state action which enforces discrimination.
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rights of its members, both because such rights can only be effectively
asserted by Respondent and because denial of those rights will in
all likelihood cause great property loss to Respondent.
4. The Constitutional Right of Freedom of Association by Private
Individuals in Privately Organized Associations Far Outweighs Any
Right Petitioner Might Assert To Be Free From Discrimination in
Society
Petitioner frankly admits that he must secure an extension of the
concept of state action in order to prevail in this cause. He admits
that with the exception of a newly-born federal court decision, as
yet untried by the process of appellate procedure (and clearly dis-
tinguishable on the facts), he has no authority on point to support
his view. Yet he urges that this high court of our state should extend
the definition of state action to meet the factual situation here. He
claims that this is necessary in order that minority groups be allowed
the fullest expression of their civil liberties under the protection of
the fourteenth amendment.
But even granting the validity of all that petitioner claims (which
we are convinced is refuted by the weight of authority, as has been
argued heretofore), he has established only that his plea is entitled
to be considered by this court. Petitioner must proceed further and
establish not only that he has a constitutional right entitled to be
heard here, but that this constitutional right is superior to the con-
stitutional protection afforded the Respondent. This we submit he
cannot do.
The recent decision in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,""
indicates that there is a point at which the rights of freedom of as-
sociation predominate over other public policy considerations. In
this case the majority of the Court applied the oft used "balancing
test" between the public policy considerations in favor of allowing
the union shop in interstate railroads and the constitutional rights
of freedom of association of individual railroad employees. The
Court halted the forced association at the point of association for
advancement of ideas and causes with which the individual did not
agree. Such forced association could not extend into the idealogical
or personal realm of the individuals involved. Thus (even when the
government does act to enforce association, as in collective bargain-
ing), there are limits to the association that can be required.
The Court only allows forced association where the industrializa-
tion and complexity of our society require it for such things as
13" 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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collective bargaining, or an integrated bar association to handle the
organization and discipline of the legal profession. "' There has been
no showing of representational or of industrial necessity in our case.
Moreover, the facts show that forced association is decidedly un-
necessary, for there is a wide variety of state and private institutions
of higher learning open to petitioner. The allegations in no way
substantiate that these institutions are not close at hand, or that these
institutions are lacking in the courses of study petitioner wishes to
pursue. We assert that the opposite is the actual situation. Within
one hour or less of downtown Pottsville, there are five institutions
of higher learning that will accept the petitioner.
The forced admittance of petitioner will undoubtedly result in
financial damage to respondent in many ways as discussed above.
This factor is worthy of consideration in any balance made between
the alleged right of petitioner to gain admittance by force to a
private institution and the constitutionally guaranteed right of free-
dom of association of the members of that institution.
5. Conclusion
That the value of private association is recognized in private edu-
cation is pointed out by Arthur S. Miller:
In addition, extending the concept of state action to true private
education would tend to jeopardize all types of private group activity.
Only the most compelling reasons would lead the Court to open that
"Pandora's box." And much of the virtues of private education are
existent because it is private and not controlled, except in a tenuous
manner, by the state. There are values to be preserved, both individual
and societal, by a continuation of the present system of education.'
This statement expresses the root of the problem. Each individual
citizen is both the creator and the creature of the state. Our status
as twentieth century citizens of the state and of the United States
is the result of governmental action. We come into the world as the
product of a marriage that has been regulated by the state. From
then on our livelihood is affected and regulated by the state in
countless ways. Are we then, as creatures of the state in many re-
spects, engaged in state action when we decide whom we shall admit
to our home or dinner table? All agree that the answer is "no."
Then where is the line to be drawn? The answer thereto has been
provided by the wisdom of the law.
The line has been drawn in the cases presented by respondent. The
petitioner seeks to trespass beyond this line into the realm which has
"4°E.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
141 Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private Schools, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 245, 263 (1957).
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always been reserved for the freedom of private individuals in
private association. He seeks not legal equality, but private equality
enforced by sanction of law. To grant such a contention is to give
to the minority group legal superiority, not equality.
In a free society all persons face discrimination in myriad forms
from the time of birth. Much of this discrimination is morally re-
prehensible. Some of it is justified. But the question before this court
today is not whether the discrimination in question by Wheat Uni-
versity is good or bad. The question is whether private individuals
and private groups are to remain free to make their own decisions
on such questions. Diversity is the one great principle of our society.
There is no party line to which all must adhere. The state is not the
ultimate for which all live in our society. The private individual,
acting in his own way, is the ultimate. Our basic principles of gov-
ernment require a sharp distinction between state and private action.
In a diverse society discrimination is inevitable, as diverse groups
seek different ways to make their lives and the lives of others better
and more meaningful. A basic tenet of our society is that the best
society will be produced by individual private action, as each in-
dividual responds to the commandment of his God, not the coercion
of his state. Private action must remain free so long as it does not
interfere with the rights of others. Respondent has interfered with
the private rights of no one in its self-assumed task of supplying an
education to those in its community.
Under the law, respondent's private admission judgments have
not constituted state action. Even if this were not so, respondent has
an affirmative constitutional right which protects his action. There-
fore, whatever the moral judgment of this court might be, the law
and the best interests of our society as a whole, now, and for the
future, dictate a decision that respondent be allowed to continue its
private right to associate freely, and consequently, to discriminate
freely.
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